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Article
In much of the Northern United States and Western Europe, 
the concept of honor is often invoked in set phrases such as 
“it is my honor to . . . ” but it is not encountered or referenced 
widely in everyday life (Wikan, 2008). In other contexts, 
such as Turkey, other parts of the Mediterranean region, and 
Latin America, honor has a very extensive role in social life; 
it is invoked as the primary goal of life (Kardam, 2005) as 
well as the motivation for socially valued (e.g., acting hon-
estly) and destructive behaviors (e.g., honor killings). 
Although considerable research has investigated honor-
related behaviors cross-culturally, the question of cultural 
similarities and differences in the definition or meaning of 
honor is seldom addressed (for an exception, see Rodriguez 
Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2002a). The current studies 
examine the lay prototypes associated with the concept of 
honor in cultures from Western (the Northern United States) 
and Mediterranean (Turkey) regions, as a step toward under-
standing similarities and differences in the ways honor moti-
vates behavior in these societies.
Honor in Cultural Contexts
The concept of an “honor culture” was first articulated by 
anthropologists studying Mediterranean societies (Pitt-
Rivers, 1965). Nisbett and Cohen (1996) argue that in honor 
cultures, people must acquire reputations for being trust-
worthy and likely to reciprocate positive treatment (such as 
hospitality) and wrongdoings (through vengeance). The per-
son who fails to behave according to the honor code, which 
spells out acceptable behavior, or who has no concern for 
the opinions of others, is viewed as untrustworthy, loses 
stature in the community, and may incur many other tangi-
ble and intangible costs. In contrast, in nonhonor (or dig-
nity) cultures, the individual is assumed to have inherent 
worth that is equal to every other person’s worth and that 
cannot be taken away by others (Leung & Cohen, 2011). 
Internal standards and goals rather than social expectations 
are the ideal motivators of good behavior. Thus, compared 
with members of honor cultures, members of dignity cul-
tures are less concerned about reputation or reciprocity and 
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are more likely to overlook slights or insults (e.g., Cohen, 
Nisbett, Bowdle, & Schwarz, 1996).
Recent sociopsychological research suggests that cultures 
differ not only in how honor is defended and maintained 
(e.g., Cohen et al., 1996; Rodriguez Mosquera, Fischer, 
Manstead, & Zaalberg, 2008; Vandello, Cohen, Grandon, & 
Franiuk, 2009) but also in how it is understood and concep-
tualized. For example, in a study where Spanish and Dutch 
participants responded to the question “What does honor 
mean to you?” Rodriguez Mosquera et al. (2002a) found that 
Dutch participants were more likely than Spaniards to gener-
ate items related to positive feedback for accomplishments 
and one’s achievements, whereas Spanish participants were 
more likely than Dutch to generate items related to behaving 
interdependently. There were no cultural differences in fre-
quencies of items coded into categories reflecting one’s 
sense of worth or one’s socioeconomic status (SES). When 
Uskul, Cross, Sunbay, Gerçek-Swing, and Ataca (2012) 
asked Turkish and Northern U.S. participants to describe 
situations that would threaten or enhance one’s honor, their 
responses differed on several dimensions: Compared with 
the Northern U.S. situations, the Turkish situations were 
more likely to refer to false accusations, unfair treatment, or 
physical or sexual attacks. In contrast, the Northern U.S. sit-
uations were more likely to focus on criticizing a person’s 
ideas or character or on revealing a person’s lack of integrity. 
When asked about situations that would enhance a person’s 
honor, Turkish participants were more likely than Americans 
to report situations in which an individual accomplished 
something positive, whereas Americans were more likely to 
describe situations in which a person helped others. These 
differences suggest that the cognitive representations of 
honor may differ in these two groups.
Theoretical conceptualizations of honor also differ. 
Bowman (2006) defines honor as “the good opinion of the 
people who matter to us . . . [because they] have the power to 
judge our behavior” (p. 4). Salzman (2008) also focused on 
honor as “public opinion’s judgment of one’s actions” (p. 
105), but he emphasized the importance of one’s place in the 
social dominance hierarchy as key to understanding honor 
(see also Henry, 2009). Some scholars have focused on reci-
procity (of good deeds and bad) as the key element of an 
honor culture (Miller, 1993; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). Others 
have articulated a dual theory of honor including the indi-
viduals’ feelings of self-worth and their social recognition by 
others (Pitt-Rivers, 1965; Wikan, 2008).
Thus, the research literature and theoretical expositions 
indicate that there are diverse definitions of honor and its key 
features. The aim of the current studies is to use a systematic 
approach—the lay prototypes approach (Fehr, 1988; Fehr & 
Russell, 1991)—to investigate everyday conceptions of 
honor in two cultural contexts. An understanding of the lay 
prototypes of honor can help scientists better grasp the criti-
cal components of the phenomenon and what people mean 
when they act in the name of honor. For example, in the 
Istanbul uprisings of the summer of 2013 over the govern-
ment’s plans to raze Gezi Park, both the protestors and the 
government, who used force against the protestors, claimed 
to be partly motivated by honor (Oz, 2013; “Turkish President 
Warns,” 2013). This suggests that the everyday conceptions 
of honor in Turkey may have diverse components that can 
motivate quite different behaviors. Examination of lay con-
ceptions of honor can identify biases or hidden assumptions 
in the existing research, and lay conceptions can be used to 
assess competing theories (Fehr, 2005). Finally, the specific 
features and dimensions of the construct identified through a 
prototype analysis can contribute to the refinement of mea-
surement tools.
In this work, we use a prototype approach to uncover the 
content and structure of the layperson’s conceptions of honor 
in Turkey and in the Northern United States. In contrast to the 
classic understanding of category membership, a prototype 
approach acknowledges that many categories have fuzzy 
boundaries and that some features of category membership 
are more central to the understanding of the category than 
other features (Rosch, 1975). As Fehr (2005) notes, much of 
the research using a prototype approach has attempted to 
answer the “What is it?” question. For example, researchers 
have investigated prototypical conceptions of love (Fehr, 
1994), forgiveness (Kearns & Fincham, 2004), and modesty 
(Gregg, Hart, Sedikides, & Kumashiro, 2008). The prototype 
approach has also been used to identify similarities and differ-
ences between related constructs, such as love and commit-
ment (Fehr, 1988). Once the prototypical features of a concept 
have been identified, one can also examine whether a mean-
ingful set of dimensions underlies those features (Aron & 
Westbay, 1996; Hassebrauck & Fehr, 2002). These dimen-
sions can be compared with experts’ theories and may either 
confirm them or reveal overlooked components of the con-
cept (Aron & Westbay, 1996; Fehr & Russell, 1991).
Although the empirical evidence and existing theories of 
honor indicate differences in the lay prototypes of honor in 
Turkey and in the Northern United States, it is possible that 
the types or degree of differences depend on the level of anal-
ysis. First, differences may be found at the level of the basic 
features of the prototype; members of the two cultural groups 
could generate quite different terms relevant to the construct 
of honor, or they could generate similar terms but evaluate 
their centrality to the prototype differently. Second, examina-
tion of the latent structure of the prototypicality of the fea-
tures could reveal a similar or different structure in the two 
groups, as well as similar or different associations between 
the latent dimensions for the groups. Finally, even if a similar 
latent structure is found for the prototypical features in the 
two groups, the associations of the dimensions with other 
constructs may differ between the cultural groups. There may 
be some deep structure central to the conceptualization of 
honor that is shared in the two groups, but the cultures may 
differ in the degree to which they emphasize, recognize, or act 
on different aspects of this shared structure.
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The investigation of lay prototypes has great research 
promise across cultures, but to date, it has been seldom used 
to address culture comparative questions. Other researchers 
have used a prototype approach to examine whether the 
structure of a set of concepts (e.g., emotion terms) identified 
in one culture can also be found in other cultures (Hassebrauck 
& Fehr, 2002; Shaver, Murdaya, & Fraley, 2001; Shaver, 
Wu, & Schwartz, 1992). Our investigation revealed only one 
other study (Smith, Turk Smith, & Christopher, 2007) that 
concurrently examined the prototypical features of a concept 
across different cultures; these authors did not, however, 
investigate the latent structure of the prototype. Thus, the 
present studies are the first to use a prototype approach to 
identify cultural similarities and differences in the features of 
a prototype and to search for meaningful dimensions under-
lying that prototype.
Overview of Studies
This research used the prototype approach to identify the 
content and structure of Turkish and Northern American con-
ceptions of honor and to compare these conceptions across 
the two cultural groups. Honor is a core value in Turkish 
society (Kardam, 2005), but Turkey differs importantly from 
the countries in which most psychological research on honor 
is conducted. Turkey is a collectivist culture with an Islamic 
heritage, in contrast to the Protestant or Catholic worldviews 
that have shaped individualistic European and American 
societies. In addition, relatively little contemporary research 
in social psychology has focused on Southeast European/
Middle Eastern societies; so, this research expands honor 
research to a new region and religion.
Four primary goals guided our studies: (a) to identify the 
central and peripheral features of honor as reported by lay 
people in the Northern United States and Turkey; (b) to 
investigate whether there are meaningful underlying dimen-
sions to those features; (c) to test whether these dimensions, 
if found, differ across the two cultures; and (d) if meaningful 
dimensions of honor are found, to examine their associations 
with other theoretically related measures.
Studies 1a and 1b
The purpose of Study 1 was to first to compile the features of 
the prototype of honor in each cultural context and then to 
have participants identify the features that are more or less 
central to the prototype. Following the methods defined by 
Fehr (1988, 1994), in Study 1a, we first asked Turkish and 
Northern American participants of European background to 
generate all the features of honor they could, using a free-
response format. Trained coders combined conceptually 
similar features to create a smaller list of meaningful fea-
tures. We examined the average number of features gener-
ated by members of each group as well as overlap in the 
features generated. In Study 1b, another group of participants 
in each cultural group rated the features generated by their 
co-nationals for their centrality to the concept of honor. 
Highly prototypical features are defined as those that are fre-
quently mentioned in Study 1a and rated as highly central in 
Study 1b.
Study 1a Method
Participants. The Turkish sample consisted of 84 (56 women) 
undergraduates from a large public university in Istanbul. 
The Northern American sample consisted of 106 (52 women) 
European American undergraduates from a public northern 
university. Participants in all studies participated in groups 
of 5 to 20 and received course credit for their participation.
Procedure. To make conceptions of honor salient for partici-
pants, they were first asked to think for a minute about the 
ways that the word “honor” is used. They then responded to 
two open-ended questions: (a) What comes to your mind 
when you think of an individual’s personal honor? (b) What 
does it mean to be a person with honor? These questions 
were presented as part of a larger study on the meaning of 
honor.
We carefully selected the Turkish term onur as a transla-
tion of the term honor in English, because other honor 
researchers have suggested that it is the most similar in 
meaning to the Northern North American understanding of 
honor (see Sev’er & Yurdakul, 2001). Moreover, onur is gen-
der neutral in its usage, unlike many other possible Turkish 
translations of honor. Following procedures used by other 
researchers who worked with particular concepts in different 
languages (e.g., Smith et al., 2007), the team fluent in Turkish 
and English who translated and backtranslated instructions 
and questionnaires also agreed that the terms onur and honor 
were the closest in meaning in the two languages. Thus, 
cross-cultural differences in responses are unlikely to occur 
due to a construct bias introduced by the use of two different 
terms in this multilingual cross-cultural research.
Included in this study (and in all the subsequent studies) 
were questions about age, family SES (1 = very poor to 9 = 
very wealthy), and religious devotion (1 = not at all devout to 
9 = extremely devout).The analysis of cultural differences in 
these measures is provided in a footnote.1
Results and Discussion
Turkish participants appeared to have more complex repre-
sentations of honor than did Northern Americans. Turkish 
participants generated an average of 7.42 individual features 
(SD = 3.2), whereas Northern Americans generated an aver-
age of 4.97 features (SD = 2.49), t(190) = 5.96, p < .001, d = 
.85. To create a list of unique features of honor, two bilingual 
coders examined the Turkish responses; one bilingual and 
two English speakers examined the Northern American 
responses. Following the procedure described by Fehr 
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(1988), coders divided the open-ended responses into mean-
ingful linguistic units (e.g., “someone who is faithful and 
loyal” includes two linguistic units: (a) someone who is faith-
ful, (b) someone who is loyal). First, monolexemic responses 
such as “honest” were grouped together. Then, these features 
were aggregated into larger groups. Phrases such as some-
one’s honesty were included with the corresponding mono-
lexemic category (e.g., honest). Words that were judged to be 
synonymous (e.g., brave and courageous) were grouped 
together. Words that were similar in meaning but not synony-
mous were kept separate (e.g., honesty and truthfulness). 
Second, phrases with qualifiers and adjectives, as well as 
descriptions of particular situations and behaviors, were 
carefully examined. Phrases that were very similar in mean-
ing were grouped together (e.g., the phrases Someone who 
does good things and To do something good were grouped 
into the general feature of “Doing good things”). When a 
qualifier was judged to create a different feature, it was kept 
separate (e.g., accomplishments and taking pride in accom-
plishments were treated as different features). Consistent 
with Fehr’s procedure, idiosyncratic features mentioned by 
only one person were dropped from further analysis. This 
resulted in 70 Turkish and 75 Northern American unique 
features.
Tables 1 and 2 present the features generated by Turkish 
and Northern American participants, respectively, ordered by 
frequency. Most notable are the differences in the frequen-
cies of the most common features. In the Turkish sample, the 
most commonly mentioned feature of honor is honesty, gen-
erated by 40% of the participants, followed by namus, gener-
ated by 20% of the participants.2 In contrast, the most 
frequently mentioned Northern American features—doing 
the right thing and being respected—were mentioned by 
only 15% of the sample. Thus, a greater proportion of Turkish 
participants agreed on the specific features of honor com-
pared with the American participants.3
We also examined the overlap in the features generated by 
Turkish and Northern American participants using the index 
of inter-prototype similarity (Cantor, Mischel, & Schwartz, 
1982). This index is the ratio of shared to unique attributes in 
pairs of descriptor lists, and in the Cantor et al. (1982) study 
of prototypes of situations, the similarities ranged from .00 to 
1.30. Sixteen features (indicated in bold in Tables 1 and 2) 
were generated by participants in both samples (e.g., being 
respected, honesty), resulting in a ratio of .14, which repre-
sents a fairly low level of similarity in the two lists. Thus, 
there were substantial differences in the features of honor 
generated by Turkish and Northern American participants.
One of the interesting differences in the features men-
tioned by these two groups was in the degree to which they 
mentioned what one should not do (e.g., not going back on 
your word, not cheating). Of the features mentioned by two 
or more participants, 21 of 70 (30%) statements by Turkish 
participants were phrased in the negative, whereas only 3 of 
75 (4%) statements by Northern Americans were negations, 
χ2(1) = 12.75, p < .001. This finding highlights the impor-
tance of the honor code and Turkish participants’ greater 
awareness of the ways that honor can be lost, compared with 
Northern American participants.
Study 1b Method
Participants. The Turkish sample consisted of 197 (146 
women) undergraduates from a large public university in 
Istanbul. The Northern U.S. sample consisted of 249 (145 
women) European American undergraduates from a public 
northern university.
Materials and procedure. The list of features in Tables 1 and 2 
were used to create separate questionnaires for Turkish and 
Northern U.S. participants, who rated only the features gen-
erated by their co-nationals. Participants first read the 
instructions describing the concept of a prototype using 
examples and then were asked to rate how central the listed 
attributes were to their concept of having honor (1 = this fea-
ture is an extremely poor indicator of having honor; 7 = this 
feature is an extremely good indicator of having honor). The 
instructions were translated and backtranslated to ensure 
equivalence, and the features were presented in two counter-
balanced orders.
Results and Discussion
Tables 1 and 2 present the mean centrality rating of each fea-
ture. As shown there, some frequently listed features (such as 
to be respectable in the community in the Turkish data) were 
not evaluated as highly central to the concept of honor. The 
correlation of the rank order of these centrality ratings with 
their frequencies obtained in Study 1a was statistically sig-
nificant for the Northern U.S. features, r = .28, p < .02, but 
only marginally significant for the Turkish features, r = .21, 
p < .08. Using Fisher’s r-to-z transformation, this difference 
was not significant, p > .20. These correlations are in line 
with the correlations found in other studies of lay prototypes 
(e.g., r = .17 for features of forgiveness, Kearns & Fincham, 
2004; r = .33 for features of relationship quality, Hassebrauck, 
1997). Hassebrauck (1997) suggests that an availability heu-
ristic may influence participants’ generation of the features, 
such that the features that come to mind easily (perhaps 
because of common folk sayings or proverbs) will be listed 
more frequently. In contrast, relatively systematic processes 
may drive the centrality ratings. These divergent processes 
may account for the relatively low correlations between fre-
quency and centrality.
What comprises the prototypical features of honor in each 
group? In Turkey, the features that are high in frequency 
(mentioned by 7% or more) and in centrality (rated 5.5 or 
higher on a 7-point scale) include honesty, keeping promises, 
not telling lies, trustworthiness, having personal values, 
truthfulness, dignity, self-respect, not being a hypocrite, and 
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Table 1. Frequency and Importance of Features of Honor for the Turkish Sample.
Study 1a Study 1b
Concept Percentage of participants Centrality ratings
Honesty 40.00 6.27
Namus2 20.00 4.70
Keeping promises 15.29 6.22
To be respectable in the community 15.29 4.36
To fit into the rules of the society 15.29 4.27
Not telling lies 14.12 6.01
Having morals 12.94 5.41
Trustworthiness 11.76 6.09
Having personal values 11.76 5.61
Personal characteristics 11.76 5.41
Consistency 11.76 5.30
To fit into general moral expectations 11.76 4.77
Truthfulness 10.59 5.92
Dignity 9.41 5.99
Self-respect 9.41 5.83
One’s pride 9.41 5.36
One’s position in the society 9.41 3.76
Not being a hypocrite 7.06 6.23
Not to steal anything 7.06 5.98
Being good 7.06 5.49
Being respectful 7.06 5.47
Being respected 7.06 4.59
Not only thinking about oneself but also other people 7.06 5.36
Having a clean life 7.06 5.27
Not needing help from other people 7.06 3.94
Not to cheat on people 5.88 6.16
To have legitimate earnings 5.88 6.00
An individual’s personality or character 5.88 5.84
To look out for one’s own values 5.88 5.55
Control mechanism 5.88 5.13
Not to let oneself be oppressed by others 5.88 4.82
Not to cause other people to talk about one’s self 5.88 4.50
Not to be unjust 4.71 6.31
Not going back on your word 4.71 6.13
Virtuousness 4.71 5.88
Not causing harm to other people 4.71 5.63
Not compromising one’s own characteristics 4.71 5.46
One’s attitude toward life 4.71 5.37
Charity 4.71 4.95
Being mature 4.71 4.92
Being appreciated 4.71 3.72
Being just 3.53 6.25
Not to let someone down 3.53 6.09
To have values pertaining to conscience 3.53 5.87
To have one’s own principles 3.53 5.52
Not to cause other people to talk about one’s family members 3.53 5.20
To keep one’s head high 3.53 4.95
How much the society values a person 3.53 4.20
To be protective of others 3.53 3.97
Not to take advantage of one’s professional position to gain personal benefits 2.35 6.26
Not to use others for one’s own benefit 2.35 5.79
(continued)
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Study 1a Study 1b
Concept Percentage of participants Centrality ratings
To look out for humanitarian values 2.35 5.76
Not to covet other people’s possessions 2.35 5.62
To put moral values above the material ones 2.35 5.47
To be helpful to other people (helping others) 2.35 5.32
Loyalty 2.35 5.31
Not committing any crime 2.35 5.28
The value one gives to himself or herself 2.35 5.22
Being able to criticize oneself 2.35 5.20
Having ethics 2.35 5.13
To behave in appropriate ways 2.35 5.07
Not to gossip 2.35 4.96
Being determined 2.35 4.81
Not to humiliate one’s self 2.35 4.56
To apply one’s own virtues 2.35 4.51
Not to be a burden on anyone 2.35 4.49
The impression one makes on others by his or her behavior 2.35 4.40
To fit into the customs and traditions 2.35 3.46
To reach a certain status in the society 2.35 3.45
Not to have one’s own truths to contradict with society 2.35 3.05
Note. Bold text refers to concepts that were spontaneously generated by the Turkish and American participants. For the percentage of participants in the 
American sample, please refer to Table 2. Centrality was rated on a 1- to 7-point scale.
Table 1. (continued)
Table 2. Frequency and Importance of Features of Honor for the American Sample.
Study 1 Study 2
Concept Percentage of participants Centrality ratings
Doing the right thing 14.95 6.05
Being respected 14.95 5.73
Trustworthiness 14.02 6.15
Being respectful 13.08 5.96
To be looked up to 13.39 5.40
To feel proud of oneself 12.15 5.08
Honesty 11.21 6.27
Integrity 11.21 6.02
Self-respect 10.28 5.54
Having accomplishments 10.28 4.92
Having morals 9.35 5.97
How a person feels about himself or herself 9.35 4.96
Taking pride in one’s own accomplishments 7.48 5.02
Helping others 6.54 5.83
Following one’s own morals 6.54 5.79
Having personal values 6.54 5.68
How one acts 6.54 5.58
Being hardworking 6.54 5.51
Having achievements 6.54 4.75
Loyalty 5.61 6.12
Putting others first 5.61 5.59
An individual’s personality or character 5.61 5.50
Being brave 5.61 5.45
(continued)
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Study 1 Study 2
Concept Percentage of participants Centrality ratings
Being in the military 5.61 4.77
Doing good things 4.67 5.78
Dignity 4.67 5.74
Having one’s own beliefs 4.67 5.39
Being respected for one’s achievements 4.67 5.08
Having respect 3.74 5.90
Being dependable 3.74 5.97
Being a responsible person 3.74 5.96
Being reliable 3.74 5.96
To be involved in community work 3.74 5.93
Being admirable 3.74 5.93
Truthfulness 2.80 6.13
Not going back on your word 2.80 6.08
Being faithful 2.80 5.88
Doing good things for others 2.80 5.88
To respect things 2.80 5.83
Being just 2.80 5.73
Being willing to sacrifice 2.80 5.72
Selflessness 2.80 5.58
Kindness 2.80 5.55
Saving someone 2.80 5.53
To be respected for what you are 2.80 5.51
Excelling in school 2.80 5.48
Being a leader 2.80 5.46
Being strong 2.80 5.45
To be respected for what you do 2.80 5.44
Pride in one’s family 2.80 5.41
To be highly regarded 2.80 5.27
Having goals 2.80 5.22
Having self-esteem 2.80 5.11
How someone presents himself or herself 2.80 5.02
What a person is proud of 2.80 4.54
To be smart 2.80 4.07
Having ethics 1.87 5.91
Being a good person 1.87 5.84
Being dedicated 1.87 5.83
Doing great deeds 1.87 5.60
Keeping to one’s ideals 1.87 5.57
Not giving into temptations 1.87 5.46
Doing something for society 1.87 5.45
To be respectable in the community 1.87 5.29
Listen to one’s conscience 1.87 5.27
How one holds himself or herself 1.87 5.26
Wisdom 1.87 5.25
Being confident 1.87 5.23
Being worthy 1.87 5.08
To make others proud 1.87 4.82
Not cheating 1.87 4.66
Being successful 1.87 4.55
Having ability 1.87 4.43
Staying healthy 1.87 4.28
Winning an award 1.87 4.16
Note. Bold text refers to concepts that were spontaneously generated by the Turkish and American participants. For the percentage of participants in the 
Turkish sample, please refer to Table 1. Centrality was rated on a 1- to 7-point scale.
Table 2. (continued)
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not to steal anything. The largest proportion of these items 
focus on moral behavior and self-respect. In the Northern 
United States, the features that were frequently mentioned 
(by 6.5% or more) and rated as highly central (rated 5.5 or 
higher) included doing the right thing, being respected, trust-
worthiness, being respectful, being honest, integrity, self-
respect, having morals, helping others, following one’s own 
morals, having personal values, how one acts, and being 
hardworking. These items also reflect good behavior, but in 
contrast to the Turkish list, there is relatively little mention of 
specific moral behaviors. Instead, the moral code is reflected 
in vague generalities, such as do the right thing and having 
morals. In both groups, however, honesty, trustworthiness, 
and having personal values are viewed as central to the pro-
totype of honor, along with self-respect.
In summary, the Turkish participants generated more fea-
tures of honor than did Northern American participants, but 
the number of unique features generated in each group were 
similar. There was relatively little overlap in the unique fea-
tures generated by the two groups, indicating differences in 
their cognitive representations of honor. One of the most 
noticeable differences was that the Turkish features were more 
likely than the Northern American features to indicate some-
thing that one should not do. There was also a greater agree-
ment among Turkish participants on the specific features of 
honor compared with the Northern American participants.
Study 2
Study 2 examines the cultural similarities and differences in 
the centrality of the features of honor and their latent struc-
ture. We asked a new sample of participants in each cultural 
group to rate the items combined from the Turkish and 
Northern U.S. sets of items from Study 1b to have a compre-
hensive catalog of features.
First, we examined the similarity between the Turkish and 
Northern American participants’ centrality ratings of the 
combined set of features. Second, we examined each group’s 
ratings of features generated by members of their own soci-
ety compared with the features generated by members of the 
other society. We hypothesized that participants will rate the 
features unique to their own culture as more central to their 
concept of honor than features unique to the other cultural 
group. Third, we examined the latent structure of the ratings 
of the combined set of features by members of the two 
groups. We addressed two questions in these analyses: 
(a) Are the dimensions underlying the ratings by the two 
groups similar or different? and (b) If we find similar dimen-
sions, are the ratings of the centrality of the dimensions simi-
lar in the two groups?
Method
Participants. The Turkish sample consisted of 334 (203 
women) undergraduates from two different universities in 
Istanbul. The Northern U.S. sample consisted of 275 (177 
women) European American undergraduates from a public 
northern university. Due to missing data, the sample sizes 
differ for some analyses.
Procedure and measures. The items administered to the two 
groups in Study 1b were translated and backtranslated and 
combined into a single set of 117 items (items generated in 
both groups were listed only once). Participants rated the 
items using a 7-point scale (1 = this feature is an extremely 
poor indicator of having honor; 7 = this feature is an 
extremely good indicator of having honor). The features 
were presented in two counterbalanced orders in the partici-
pants’ native language.
Results and Discussion
Comparisons of ratings by the two groups. Examination of the 
association between the two group’s ratings of the set of 
items revealed that the Turkish and Northern U.S. ratings 
were moderately highly correlated, r(116) = .62, p < .001. As 
hypothesized, participants rated the features generated by 
members of their own culture as more central to their proto-
types of honor than features generated by the other cultural 
group, F(1, 607) = 992.43, p < .001, η2p = .62 (items gener-
ated in both settings were excluded; see Table 3). The differ-
ence in ratings of the items from the two countries was 
greater for the Turkish participants (d = 1.11) than for the 
Northern American participants (d = 0.18). Indeed, the Turk-
ish participants’ ratings of the American items were much 
lower than the Northern Americans’ ratings of the Turkish 
items, t(607) = 11.91, p < .001, d = 0.99. This finding sug-
gests that the Turkish conception of honor is more differenti-
ated than that of Northern Americans.
Exploratory factor analysis. We conducted principal compo-
nent analysis with oblique rotation separately within each 
Table 3. Means of Centrality Ratings for Unique Features Generated Within Each Cultural Context.
Group Features generated by TR participants Features generated by U.S. participants t d
Turkey 5.16 (.71) 4.27 (.89) 33.79*** 1.11
Northern United States 5.04 (.65) 5.16 (.71) 8.08*** 0.18
Note. Standard deviations are provided in parentheses. n (Turkey) = 334; n (Northern United States) = 275.
***p < .001.
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cultural group to examine the dimensions that underlay lay 
conceptions of honor. An examination of the scree plots for 
both groups indicated that a four-factor solution was most 
fitting (Russell, 2002). To clarify the factors, we dropped 
items that loaded less than .40 on a factor or that loaded 
greater than .30 on more than one factor (as suggested by 
Fischer & Fontaine, 2011). A new factor analysis with a final 
set of 36 items was conducted using oblique rotation; the 
rotated factors with pattern matrix coefficients are presented 
in Table 4.
The four-factor solution explained 52.9% of the variance 
in the ratings for Turkish participants and 49.8% of the vari-
ance for Northern Americans. Examination of the Northern 
American and Turkish factor structures reveals several simi-
larities. In both groups, the first factor includes items such as 
“To reach a certain status in society,” and “How much the 
society values a person.” This factor reflects the notion of 
honor as social reputation and one’s regard by others, and 
was labeled “Social Status/Respect.” The second factor 
includes a variety of actions that one should or should not do, 
such as not cheating and being just. This factor reflects the 
importance of codes of personal conduct and was labeled 
“Moral Behavior.”
The third factor includes items such as to have one’s own 
virtues, the value one gives to himself/herself, and having 
self-esteem. It includes items that tap the importance of one’s 
moral convictions and the feeling that one is a person worthy 
of respect; it was labeled “Self-Respect.” The final factor 
includes items such as to be helpful to others and doing 
something for society. This factor reflects involvement in the 
welfare of others; it was labeled “Helping Others.” The vari-
ances accounted for by these four factors were 27.6%, 11.5%, 
Table 4. Rotated Factor Structure of Turkish and Northern American Centrality Ratings of Features of Honor from Turkey and the 
Northern US (Study 2).
Turkey Northern United States
Features
Social Status/
Respect
Moral
Behavior Self-Respect Helping Others
Social Status/
Respect
Moral
Behavior Self-Respect Helping Others
One's position in the society .811 −.062 .031 .000 .796 .022 −.038 .052
To reach a certain status in the society .805 −.033 .052 −.002 .858 .051 .052 .075
How much the society values a person .817 .020 .029 −.022 .817 .023 .095 −.065
To be respectable in the community .818 .092 .114 −.167 .672 −.001 −.042 −.074
Being admirable .798 −.022 .083 −.015 .457 .092 −.173 −.161
Being appreciated .726 −.027 .007 .125 .666 −.052 −.197 −.053
Not to have one's own truths to contradict with society's 
truths
.659 .047 −.208 .121 .611 −.040 .036 −.122
To be highly regarded .708 .061 .005 .091 .722 −.050 −.116 .001
To fit into customs and traditions .593 .119 −.191 .044 .737 .111 .047 .037
To make others proud .609 −.008 .220 −.028 .612 −.043 −.057 −.181
To be respected for what you do .570 −.015 .219 .107 .556 −.020 −.211 −.020
Winning an award .594 −.153 .170 .134 .725 .051 −.019 .024
Not being a hypocrite .051 .843 −.040 −.082 −.153 .537 −.187 −.086
Not telling lies .030 .745 −.096 .028 .114 .787 .051 .020
Keeping promises .050 .702 .049 .003 −.062 .545 −.093 −.153
Being just −.174 .658 .158 .212 −.188 .500 −.125 −.149
Not cheating .079 .690 −.033 .047 .056 .814 .025 .081
Honesty .036 .681 .069 .031 −.035 .698 −.060 .079
Not to use others for one's own benefit −.046 .685 .067 −.009 .117 .570 .140 −.125
Not to steal anything −.030 .638 −.006 .045 .107 .720 −.003 .001
To have one's own principles −.069 .133 .721 −.055 −.120 −.029 −.745 −.149
To apply one's own virtues −.069 −.105 .714 −.033 −.064 .244 −.570 .067
Not compromising one's own characteristics .053 .161 .559 −.172 .009 .065 −.477 −.056
What a person is proud of .168 .031 .566 −.145 .251 .133 −.440 .209
Having one's own beliefs .071 .010 .611 .023 −.034 −.043 −.753 −.006
Not to let oneself be oppressed by others .039 .022 .566 −.051 −.077 −.004 −.520 −.235
How one holds him/herself −.022 −.046 .600 .072 .144 .061 −.612 .111
Being confident .112 −.028 .588 .132 .203 .090 −.463 −.098
Being determined .133 .081 .567 .108 .201 −.013 −.511 −.127
Having self-esteem −.007 .089 .654 .178 .253 −.050 −.577 −.035
The value one gives to himself/herself −.019 −.066 .696 .116 .270 .028 −.583 .099
To be helpful to other people −.043 .178 .040 .785 .120 .208 .011 −.662
Doing good things for others −.028 .108 −.039 .770 .001 .209 .052 −.646
To be involved in community work .072 .001 .103 .709 .274 −.017 .008 −.714
Being willing to sacrifice .122 −.057 .040 .686 −.103 .042 −.241 −.515
Doing something for society .172 .087 −.057 .665 .181 −.034 −.066 −.686
Note. Item labels in italicized font were generated by Turkish participants; item labels in bold font were generated by both Turkish and American participants. Loadings greater 
than .40 are in bold font.
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9.3%, and 4.6%, respectively, among Turkish participants 
and 28.7%, 10.8%, 5.6%, and 4.7% among Northern U.S. 
participants.
To determine whether this four-factor solution fit simi-
larly for both cultural groups, we performed a Procrustes 
rotation. We set the Turkish factor structure as the normative 
group, and rotated the Northern U.S. factor structure toward 
the Turkish structure. Using the syntax provided by Fischer 
and Fontaine (2011), which calculates congruence coeffi-
cients, we found that the two factor structures were similar. 
The most stringent analysis revealed identity coefficients of 
.95 for Social Status/Respect, .93 for Moral Behavior, .94 for 
Self-Respect, and .88 for Helping Others. These values indi-
cate an adequate to good similarity of these factors in these 
groups (see criterion by Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997).
Mean differences in centrality and correlations of dimensions. We 
averaged the items for each factor to create a dimension 
score. Before comparing these means, we centered all the 
dimension scores on their own cultural group’s grand mean 
to tackle group differences in scale use; the Turkish grand 
mean (4.93, SD = .77) was lower than the Northern U.S 
grand mean (5.25, SD = .63), t(607) = 5.70, p < .001, d = .45. 
As shown in Table 5, Turkish and Northern U.S participants 
viewed Moral Behavior as the most central to the concept of 
honor and Social Status/Respect as the least central. 
Repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a significant interac-
tion between the dimensions and cultural group, F(1, 606) = 
45.66, p < .001, η2p = .07. Comparisons across cultures 
revealed differences in the means of Moral Behavior (TR > 
US) and Helping Others (TR < US; see Table 5).4
These factors were somewhat more highly correlated in 
the Northern U.S. data than in the Turkish data. R-to-z 
transformations showed that correlations of the Self-
Respect factor with the Moral Behavior factor and the 
Helping Others factor were stronger among Northern 
Americans than among Turkish participants, zs ≥ −2.93, ps 
< 01. There also was a marginally significant tendency for 
the correlation between the Social Status/Respect factor 
and the Self-Respect factor to be stronger among the 
Northern Americans than the Turkish participants, z = 
−1.81, p = .08. Thus, the latent dimensions are less strongly 
differentiated among the Northern Americans than among 
the Turkish participants, suggesting that Northern 
Americans’ conceptions of honor are not as clearly elabo-
rated or complex as those of Turkish participants.
In summary, these results suggest that the Turkish con-
ception of honor is more complex and differentiated than that 
of Northern Americans. The factor analysis revealed that 
honor is a multifaceted construct in Turkey and the Northern 
Unite States and that similar factor structures explain the ratings 
in both groups. These results extend the classic theorizing 
and definition of honor as a sense of self-worth and social 
respect (Pitt-Rivers, 1965) through the identification of the 
dimensions of moral behavior and helping others.
Study 3
Our final study examined whether the four dimensions identi-
fied in Study 2 replicate when people evaluate the personal 
importance of these features. At least theoretically, the dimen-
sions underlying the prototype of honor could differ from 
those underlying individuals’ views of the importance of these 
features to themselves. Replication of the dimensions would 
provide support for their importance at the individual level and 
would aid in the refinement of measures of these dimensions.
A second goal of this study was to establish the validity of 
these dimensions by assessing their relations to theoretically 
related constructs. We expected a measure of individual and 
family social respect, the Honor Values Scale (HVS; 
Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2008), to be positively associated 
with these dimensions. Theoretically, the Social Status/
Respect dimension should relate positively to other measures 
that tap the importance of others’ approval for self-worth and 
negatively to the perception that one’s value as an individual 
is inalienable and independent of others’ respect. We tap these 
constructs using the Others’ Approval subscale of the 
Contingency of Self-Worth Scale (CSWS; Crocker, Luhtanen, 
Cooper, & Bouvrette, 2003) and the Inalienable Worth mea-
sure (Leung & Cohen, 2011). The Moral Behavior dimension 
encompasses a variety of actions related to the individual’s 
belief that he or she is a moral or virtuous person. Thus, 
Table 5. Centered Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Among Honor Factor Scores for Turkish and Northern American 
Participants (Study 2).
Turkey United States Correlations Among Factors
Factor M (SD) M (SD) F d 1 2 3 4
1. Social Status/Respect −1.11  (1.29) −1.0 (1.09) 1.18 −.09 (.94, .93) .21** .45** .49**
2. Moral Behavior 1.20 (  .82) .60 (  .71) 91.88*** .78 .23** (.88, .87) .24** .44**
3. Self-Respect −.02 (  .99) −.03 (  .77) .06 .01 .56** .45** (.87, .88) .23**
4. Helping Others −.07 (1.14) .44 (  .79) 39.55*** −.52 .42** .46** .48** (.88, .82)
Note. Within cultural group, factor scores were centered by subtracting the cultural group’s grand mean from the averaged factor score. Correlations 
above the diagonal are for the Turkish participants (n = 334); those below the diagonal are for the American participants (n = 275). Values on the diagonal 
are the coefficient alphas for the Turkish and American samples.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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self-ratings on this dimension should be positively associated 
with the Virtue subscale of the CSWS (Crocker et al., 2003). 
Finally, we examined the association of the honor factors with 
a global measure of self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1965).
Method
Participants and procedure. The Turkish sample consisted of 
287 (164 women) undergraduates from two universities in 
Istanbul and Ankara. The Northern U.S. sample consisted of 
305 (191 women) European American undergraduates from 
a public northern university. Two Northern American and 6 
Turkish participants were dropped for not following instruc-
tions. Due to missing data, the degrees of freedom may vary 
across analyses.
Measures. The questionnaires included the 36 features used 
in the final version of the honor factor analysis in Study 2 
and related measures used to examine the validity of the 
honor dimensions. Except for the importance ratings of the 
honor features, participants completed the measures using a 
7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree).
Honor features. Items reflecting honor features were 
slightly reworded to be more easily rated for their importance 
to the self. Participants indicated the importance of each item 
to themselves using a 4-point scale (0 = not important at all 
to 4 = extremely important).
HVS. The five-item HVS (Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 
2008) taps the importance of one’s own and one’s family’s 
social image (e.g., “It is important to me that others see me 
as someone who deserves respect” and “How others think of 
my family is important to me” α
TR
 = .74, α
US
 = .79).
Contingencies of Self-Worth scale. Participants responded 
to two subscales of the Crocker et al. (2003) CSWS that 
assess the extent to which an individual’s sense of self-worth 
is based on Others’ Approval (five items; for example, “I 
don’t care what other people think of me [reversed]”), α
TR
 = 
.77; α
US
 = .78, and virtue (five items; for example, “My self-
esteem would suffer if I did something unethical”), α
TR
 = .84, 
α
US
 = .85. High scores indicate strong endorsement of others’ 
approval or virtue as a basis of self-worth.
Inalienable Worth Scale. The four-item Inalienable Worth 
Scale measures the belief that an individual’s value is inalien-
able rather than socially conferred (Leung & Cohen, 2011). 
A sample item is “How others treat me is irrelevant to my 
worth as a person”; α
TR
 = .69; α
US
 = .66. Higher scores indi-
cate greater endorsement of inalienable worth of the individ-
ual as opposed to the belief that worth is socially conferred.
Global self-esteem. Global self-esteem was assessed with 
the 10-item Rosenberg (1965) Self-Esteem scale (e.g., “I 
take a positive attitude toward myself”), α
TR
 = .88; α
US
 = .87.
Structural equivalence of measures. We examined the 
cross-cultural equivalence of these related measures using 
the recommendations of Van de Vijver and Leung (1997). 
The factorial agreement calculated using the most stringent 
identity index revealed identity coefficients greater than .98 
for all the measures, indicating very high levels of factorial 
similarity across the two groups.
Results and Discussion
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). We conducted a confirma-
tory factor analysis using Mplus in which we specified the 
four-factor structure identified in Study 2. Using the com-
bined sample, the initial results indicated that there was rela-
tively poor fit of this model, comparative fit index (CFI) = 
.764, Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) 
= .081, and normed fit index (NFI) = 72.2. Even after we 
dropped variables that loaded poorly (lower than .40 on any 
factor), the fit of the model was unacceptable, CFI = .884, 
Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) = .06, 
and NFI = .84.
Because the CFA revealed a poor fit of the data, we rea-
soned that perhaps the rewording of the items and the change 
in reference from “How well does this fit the prototype of 
honor?” to “How important is this to you?” may result in a 
different factor structure. Thus, we conducted exploratory 
factor analyses on these data. We first examined a four-factor 
structure (using PCA and varimax rotation) with the two 
groups combined. The factor structure was not as clear as in 
Study 2; there were many items that loaded on more than one 
factor, and the scree plot indicated that a three-factor solution 
was preferred. Thus, we reran the analyses with a three-fac-
tor solution.
This three-factor solution was much cleaner than the 
four-factor solution, and the factors mapped onto the Moral 
Behavior, Social Status/Respect, and Self-Respect factors 
identified in Study 2. The items from the Helping Others 
subscale primarily loaded on the Moral Behavior factor. 
These three factors explained 45.2% of the variance. This 
analysis revealed four items that loaded similarly on two 
factors or that failed to load strongly on any of the factors. 
These four items were dropped from the analyses, and the 
analyses were conducted separately within each cultural 
group. This step revealed that there were seven items that 
either loaded on different factors in the two groups or that 
loaded strongly on one of the factors for one group and not 
the other. In the interest of obtaining a clear factor structure 
that would be useful for scale development, we dropped 
these seven items and reran the PCA analysis using varimax 
rotation.5
This analysis revealed a clean structure with few double 
loadings more than .4 (see Table 6). In the Turkish data, the 
variance accounted for by the Moral Behavior, Social Status/
Respect, and Self-respect factors was 24.2%, 22.7%, and 
7.9%, respectively, totaling 54.8%. In the Northern U.S. 
data, the factors accounted for 29.4%, 14.8, and 7.2% of the 
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variance, respectively, totaling 51.5%. The Procrustes analy-
sis resulted in identity coefficients of .96 for the Moral 
Behavior factor and .95 for the Social Status/Respect factor, 
which indicate good factor similarity. The identity coeffi-
cient for the third factor, Self-Respect, was lower, r = .88, 
which is above the suggested cutoff of .85 for incongruence 
(Fischer & Fontaine, 2011), but it does suggest that there is 
enough discrepancy in the factor loadings for the two groups 
to warrant caution.
Mean differences in importance and correlations of dimen-
sions. We created indices for each dimension and examined 
their means and intercorrelations (see Tables 7 and 8). Before 
comparing the means of the subscales, we centered each sub-
scale on the cultural group’s grand mean to tackle potential 
group differences in scale use; the Turkish participants (M = 
2.96, SD = .46) rated the items slightly lower than did the 
Northern American participants (M = 3.03, SD = .45), t(591) 
= 2.06, p = .04, d = .15. As shown in Table 7, the Turkish and 
Northern U.S. participants indicated that the items associated 
with Self-Respect were the most important and the items 
associated with Social Status/Respect were the least impor-
tant to them. In contrast to the results of Study 2, there were 
no significant differences between the two groups in the 
endorsement of these dimensions.6
The correlations among the factors differed for the two 
groups (Table 8). Most notably, for the Turkish sample, the 
Moral Behavior factor did not correlate with the other two 
factors, whereas both of these correlations were significant 
for the Northern Americans. R-to-z transformations revealed 
that the correlations with the Moral Behavior factor differed 
significantly for the two groups, zs ≥ 2.62, ps < .01. The cor-
relations between Self-Respect and the Social Status/Respect 
factors did not differ for the two groups, z = 0.79, ns. One 
possible explanation for the lower correlations in Turkey is 
that in a tight society, such as Turkey, social norms for behav-
ior are very strict (Gelfand et al., 2011) and moral behavior 
may be viewed as compulsory, given the honor code (Wikan, 
2008). Therefore, one cannot be viewed as an honorable per-
son without moral behavior, but doing what is expected mor-
ally may not necessarily enhance one’s social standing or 
Table 6. Rotated Factor Structure of Turkish and Northern American Centrality Ratings of Combined Turkish and American Features 
of Honor (Study 3).
Turkey United States
 
Moral 
Behavior
Social Status/
Respect Self-Respect
Moral 
Behavior
Social status/
Respect Self-Respect
To be helpful to others .793 .068 −.167 .657 .108 .236
To be honest .791 −.065 .281 .643 −.095 .432
To not tell lies .786 −.216 .239 .649 −.110 .298
To not cheat .713 −.161 .282 .629 −.108 .179
To do good things for other people .708 .225 −.201 .646 .163 .232
To be involved in community work .701 .056 −.140 .716 .169 −.116
To be willing to sacrifice .647 −.002 −.338 .661 .214 −.228
To not be a hypocrite .619 −.099 .498 .527 .062 .186
Not to use others for my own benefit .600 −.035 .261 .557 .005 .280
To keep my promises .590 −.008 .075 .567 .008 .247
To not steal anything .555 −.003 .333 .658 −.050 .251
To do something for society .552 .235 −.346 .580 .400 −.164
To be respectable in society .019 .866 .132 .139 .714 .317
To feel valued by society .037 .860 −.049 .104 .782 .166
To be highly regarded by others .001 .838 .173 −.016 .709 .281
To be appreciated by others .004 .835 .013 .133 .544 .481
To reach a certain status in society −.103 .731 .198 −.147 .794 .027
My position in the society −.002 .711 .019 .081 .790 −.011
Winning an award −.111 .576 .324 .001 .648 .173
To make others proud .262 .561 .193 .249 .512 .368
To view myself as a person with value −.089 .547 .516 .274 .177 .652
To feel proud of myself −.140 .520 .542 .063 .317 .651
To have self-esteem .047 .350 .527 .233 .158 .753
To not let myself be oppressed or mistreated by others .060 .132 .497 .168 .169 .421
To be confident .186 .203 .486 .205 .196 .700
Note. Loadings greater than .40 are in bold font.
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self-respect, because it is in response to strong social norms. 
In contrast, in the Northern United States, individuals who 
endorse the importance of moral behavior may also tend to 
base their self-respect and perceived social standing on that 
dimension (“It is important to me to be honest, which makes 
me worthy of respect”).
Honor dimensions’ associations with other measures. We 
assessed several related measures of social approval, self-
regard, and virtue to examine the honor dimensions’ conver-
gent validity. Due to the intercorrelations among the 
dimensions, we tested these associations using hierarchical 
regression analyses. First, we combined the samples and 
conducted analyses in which the comparison measures were 
regressed on the honor dimensions, a dummy variable repre-
senting cultural group, and the interactions between each of 
the honor dimensions and the group variable. This allowed 
us to examine the unique relationship between each of the 
honor dimensions and the comparison measures, controlling 
for the other honor dimensions. Where there were signifi-
cant interactions with the culture variable, we conducted 
separate analyses within each cultural group.7 Where there 
were significant Culture × Honor Dimension interactions, 
we present the regressions separately for each cultural group 
in Table 9.
HVS. When HVS was regressed onto the three honor 
dimensions, Social Status/Respect was the strongest predic-
tor of HVS (β = .53, p < .001) and Moral Behavior was also 
a significant predictor (β = .19, p < .001). The Self-Respect 
subscale did not predict HVS, but there was a significant 
Culture × Self-Respect interaction, β = −.26, p < .001; β
TR
 
= −.16, β
US
 = .17 (Table 9). Given the positive bivariate cor-
relation between the Self-Respect factor and honor values 
in the Turkish sample (Table 8), the negative beta for Self-
Respect in the Turkish sample is likely due to multicollinear-
ity between the factors.
Others’ approval contingency of worth. This analysis 
revealed a significant main effect of cultural group (β = 
−.17, p < .001); Turkish participants were more likely to 
endorse the importance of others’ approval for their self-
worth than were Northern Americans. As hypothesized, 
the Social Status/Respect subscale was the most strongly 
related to endorsement of Others’ Approval, (β = .47, p < 
.001). Self-Respect was negatively related (β = −.30; p < 
.001) and Moral Behavior was marginally related to the 
approval contingency (β = .07, p < .08). None of the interac-
tion terms was significant; thus, the association between the 
honor subscales and the approval contingency were similar 
for the two cultural groups.
Inalienable worth. We hypothesized that endorsement of 
the Inalienable Worth Scale (Leung & Cohen, 2011) would be 
positively associated with Self-Respect but negatively associ-
ated with Social Status/Respect. This analysis supported that 
hypothesis, βSocial Status = −.30, p < .001, βSelf-Respect = .32, p 
< .001. There was also a significant main effect of cultural 
group, β = .25, p < .001, which was qualified by significant 
interactions with Social Status/Respect and Self-Respect, ps 
< .03. When the analyses were conducted separately within 
culture, the results revealed first that the honor subscales 
explained more variance in the Turkish responses (20%) than 
in the Northern American responses (5%; Table 9). Consis-
tent with Leung and Cohen’s (2011) theory of honor cultures, 
the Turkish participants who viewed Social Status/Respect 
as highly important more strongly rejected the notion that 
one’s worth is inalienable, compared with Northern American 
participants.
Global self-esteem. As expected, the Self-Respect subscale 
significantly predicted self-esteem, β = .27, p < .001. There 
were no other significant main effects or interactions.
Virtue contingency of worth. As expected, the Moral 
Behavior subscale was the strongest predictor of the virtue 
contingency, β = .50, p < .001. The association between the 
other honor subscales and virtue were similar in strength but 
opposite in direction: Social Status/Respect (β = .09, p < .03) 
was positively associated with endorsement of the Virtue 
contingency, but Self-Respect (β = −.10, p < .02) was nega-
tively associated with Virtue.
There were also significant interactions between Culture 
and Social Status/Respect (β = .20, p < .001) and Self-
Respect (β = −.24, p < .001). As shown in Table 9, Social 
Status/Respect was positively associated and Self-Respect 
was negatively associated with Virtue in Turkey, but neither 
measure significantly predicted the importance of Virtue in 
the Northern United States. The Virtue items do not specify 
particular behaviors; instead, they leave it to the participant 
to define ethical or moral behavior. For Turkish participants, 
feelings of pride (as tapped by the Self-Respect subscale) 
may conflict with honor code virtues such as modesty or 
self-sacrifice. In the Northern United States, however, the 
idea that one’s value is independent of one’s behavior is 
Table 7. Centered Means and Standard Deviations of Honor 
Factor Scores for Turkish and American Participants (Study 3).
Turkey US
Factor M (SD) M (SD) F d
1. Social Status/Respect −.38 (.79) −.43 (.71) .62 .07
2. Moral Behavior .09 (.60) .09 (.53) .00 .00
3. Self-Respect .29 (.60) .34 (.52) 1.02 −.09
Note. Within cultural group, factor scores were centered by subtracting 
the cultural group’s grand mean from the averaged factor score.
*p < .05. **p < .01. *** p < .001.
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pervasive, which may account for the null association 
between Virtue and Self-Respect.
General Discussion
Research evidence and theoretical accounts of honor point to 
differing definitions of the construct in differing cultural 
contexts. These studies first sought to identify the central and 
peripheral features of honor reported by lay people in a tradi-
tional honor culture (Turkey) and a nonhonor or dignity cul-
ture (Northern United States). Studies 1a and 1b revealed 
substantial differences in the two groups at the level of the 
individual features that characterize honor. Only 16 of 145 
total features were generated by members of both groups. 
Moreover, the features generated by Turkish participants 
included more specific statements about what one should not 
do (e.g., don’t lie), whereas the Northern American features 
focused more on nonspecific positive aspects of behavior 
(e.g., do the right thing). Turkish people may be especially 
sensitive to these negative features of honor because honor is 
perceived to be easily lost and must be aggressively defended 
when attacked.
Second, we investigated whether there are meaningful 
dimensions underlying those features, and whether they dif-
fered across the two cultural groups. Factor analyses revealed 
that there were three common factors that explained substantial 
variance in the centrality ratings (Study 2) and the personal 
importance ratings (Study 3) of the combined Turkish and 
American features. These common dimensions represent 
Social Status/Respect, Moral Behavior, and Self-Respect, 
and the factor loadings were similar across the two cultures. 
These findings support the dual theory of honor that includes 
Table 9. Regression Analysis of the Associations of the Honor Factors With Other Related Measures (Study 3).
Turkey United States
Outcome measure b SE β R2 b SE β R2
Honor Values Scale
 Constant 5.81 .06 .33*** 5.62 .06 .39***
  Social Status/Respect .67 .06  .61*** .58 .06 .47***  
  Moral Behavior .28 .07 .19*** .21 .08 .13*  
  Self-Respect −.24 .08 −.16** .29 .09 .17**  
Inalienable Worth
 Constant 4.20 .08 .20*** 3.94 .09 .05*
  Social Status/Respect −.65 .09 −.46*** −.22 .10 −.15*  
  Moral Behavior .03 .10 .02 .18 .13 .09  
  Self-Respect .83 .12 .45*** .41 .14 .20**  
Virtue CSWS
 Constant 4.85 .09 .26*** 4.96 .08 .30***
  Social Status/Respect .34 .09 .22*** −.06 .08 −.05  
  Moral Behavior .96 .11 .46*** .99 .10  .53***  
  Self-Respect −.49 .12 −.24*** .13 .11  .07  
Note. Variables were centered using within-culture means prior to analyses. CSWS = Contingency of Self-Worth Scale.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Table 8. Correlations Among Honor Factors and the Theoretically Related Measures, Presented Separately by Cultural Group.
Social Status/
Respect
Moral 
Behavior Self-Respect
Honor 
Values
Approval 
CSWS
Virtue 
CSWS
Inalienable 
Worth Self-Esteem
Social Status/Respect — .03 .52** .53** .38* .10 −.23 .05
Moral Behavior .24** — .05 .20** .10 .46** .03 −.02
Self-Respect .47** .44** — .17* −.07 −.10 .20** .20**
Honor Values .58** .32** .45** — .40** .33** −.21** .06
Approval CSWS .28** .01 −.03 .26** — .32** −.62** −.26**
Virtue CSWS .12* .55** .28** .28** .07 — −.10 −.18**
Inalienable Worth −.03 .14* .17** .05 −.61** .17* — .21**
Self-Esteem .20** .18** .34** .23** −.21** .12* .33** —
Note. Correlations for the Turkish sample are above the diagonal and Northern US correlations are below the diagonal. CSWS = Contingency of Self-
Worth Scale.
*p < .05. **p < .01.
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self-worth and social recognition (Pitt-Rivers, 1965; Wikan, 
2008) and extend it by highlighting the importance of moral 
behavior for understanding honor. In short, honor is not sim-
ply respecting oneself and being respected by others. Instead, 
honor is the self- and social-esteem that has good and proper 
behavior (and not simply status, celebrity, or wealth) as its 
foundation.
Interestingly, the ranking of the centrality of these dimen-
sions for the prototype of honor in Study 2 differed from the 
rankings of personal importance in Study 3. Northern European 
American and Turkish participants rated Moral Behavior as 
the most central and Social Status/Respect as the least central 
to the prototype of honor in Study 2. In Study 3, however, 
Self-Respect was the most personally important dimension 
(and social status/respect was again the least important). 
When people consider the cognitive representation of honor, 
they may be thinking about what people in general should or 
ought to do. When considering their own values, however, 
they seem to care the most about the features that provide a 
sense of personal worth. This evidence that people weigh 
information differently when evaluating their own or others’ 
honor is consistent with a recent demonstration that partici-
pants’ own evaluations of an honor-related situation may not 
overlap with their perceptions of how others would evaluate 
that situation (Cross, Uskul, Gerçek-Swing, Sunbay, & 
Ataca, 2013).
It may be surprising that the Social Status/Respect dimen-
sion was the least central in these ratings, given its promi-
nence in much of the contemporary theories of honor cultures 
(Bowman, 2006; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Pitt-Rivers, 1965; 
Salzman, 2008; Wikan, 2008). In Turkey today, the impor-
tance of this aspect of honor is contentious. Although honor is 
a central value in Turkey, some people point to family killings 
of women who are accused of infidelity or promiscuity as the 
consequence of too much concern for reputation and social 
respect (Pope, 2012). In addition, young people living in 
urban spaces, such as those recruited in the current studies, 
may be in a life stage that involves challenging social norms 
and traditions; older, rural, or less educated adults may have 
responded differently. Despite reporting that they care less 
about others’ respect than about self-respect or moral behav-
ior, Turkish participants may behave quite differently when 
strong situations require that they actively defend their honor 
in front of others. For researchers, this finding calls attention 
to the possibility that some people will reject their culture’s 
core values and react against researchers’ attempts to assess 
these values (see Leung & Cohen, 2011). Ultimately, findings 
that contradict theoretical conceptions of a phenomenon or 
previous research prompt critical thinking and further investi-
gation that can modify or extend the existing theories.
The fourth objective of these studies was to examine 
whether these dimensions were associated with theoretically 
relevant constructs similarly in the two cultural groups. Self-
Respect, Social Status/Respect, and Moral Behavior factors 
were associated in predictable ways with measures of other 
related constructs (e.g., self-esteem, Inalienable Worth Scale, 
and contingencies of worth), but some of these associations 
varied across cultures: The Social Status/Respect subscale 
was more strongly related to other measures among Turkish 
participants than among Northern U.S. participants. Thus, 
although the Social Status/Respect dimension was the least 
important to participants, these results demonstrate that it is 
more relevant to other attitudes and beliefs in a traditional 
honor culture than in a dignity culture, where the opinions of 
others are minimized.
Do the similarities described above suggest that the 
Northern United States should not be considered a dignity 
culture? That would be a premature conclusion given the 
current data. Instead, these studies reveal that lay concep-
tions of honor in a dignity culture share some underlying 
similarities with those found in a culture of honor (despite 
considerable differences at the level of the specific features). 
Consequently, honor may fit the definition of an existential 
universal (Norenzayan & Heine, 2005). An existential uni-
versal is a phenomenon (e.g., a tool, construct, etc.) that 
exists in multiple cultures but is not necessarily used in the 
same way or accessible in the same situations across cul-
tures. The combined evidence suggests that honor is a con-
struct that exists in both of these cultures (and likely in many 
more), but it is more highly elaborated in Turkey than in the 
Northern United States, and it is likely to motivate behavior 
differently in these cultural contexts (see Uskul, Oyserman, 
Schwarz, Lee, & Xu, 2013).
Contribution to Theory and Research
Theories of a phenomenon that lose sight of lay conceptions 
risk being overly narrow and neglecting key elements of the 
phenomenon. Yet, exclusive focus on the lay prototypes of a 
phenomenon lacks the rigor and connections to other related 
theoretical formulations found in good theories (Gregg et al., 
2008). Thus, the inclusion of a prototype analysis into the 
literature on honor cultures can provide enhanced coverage 
of the concept that may lead to testable hypotheses and new 
theoretical developments. Our findings highlight the impor-
tance of moral behavior for a thorough understanding of 
honor. The role of moral behavior in cultures of honor has 
tended to be understated (or assumed) in much social-psy-
chological research (but see Leung & Cohen, 2011; 
Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2008). The moral behavior items 
identified in these analyses may prove useful in future mea-
sures. In addition, the specific features generated by these 
participants differed in their orientation toward avoidance of 
specific negative behaviors (e.g., not to tell lies, generated by 
Turkish participants) or approaching positive behaviors (e.g., 
doing the right thing, generated by Northern American par-
ticipants). This finding suggests a cultural difference in regu-
latory focus, which may underlie other cultural differences in 
honor-related behavior (Higgins, 1996). Thus, this prototype 
analysis points out potentially useful descriptive elements of 
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honor and points to ways to integrate other theories into fur-
ther research.
Second, these studies expand research on honor beyond 
the focus on aggression and reciprocity that has tended to 
dominate much of the research (at least in the United States). 
In particular, these results focus on positive aspects of honor 
and illustrate how people may mean different things when 
they claim to be acting in the name of honor. When the pro-
testors at Gezi Park in Istanbul claimed that attacks on their 
honor was partly what propelled them to act (e.g., Oz, 2013), 
it is unclear whether self-respect, the opinions of others, or a 
desire to behave morally (or all three) motivated their behav-
ior. The three dimensions are interrelated, but further research 
into their differential influence on specific behaviors as well 
as on individual differences in the strength of the three 
dimensions would provide a more nuanced understanding of 
honor.
Finally, these data can form the foundation of further 
research on related lay prototypes. We hope that by reporting 
the specific features generated, their frequencies, and their 
prototypicality ratings, we provide useful information for 
other researchers who wish to extend these findings to other 
societies (e.g., to the lay prototypes of members of other 
honor cultures, such as the Southern United States) or to 
compare these findings to the prototypes of other cultural 
constructs, such as face (Leung & Cohen, 2011).
Limitations
The prototype approach is limited in its reliance on explicit, 
verbal reports, which can be swayed by factors such as the 
context of data collection. Most of the students at these uni-
versities are living in residence halls and apartments far 
from their families. The university research context may 
focus attention on individual aspects of honor more than on 
family honor, which may explain the unexpectedly small 
number of family- or community-related features generated 
in Turkey.
One problem with comparisons of two cultural groups is 
that they may differ on many dimensions in addition to the 
dimension under investigation. Although our samples were 
generally similar in age and SES, they differed in terms of 
their religious heritage and degree of religious devotion. As 
noted in the footnotes, the Turkish samples tended to be more 
devout than the U.S. samples; furthermore, religious devo-
tion was related to the moral behavior dimension in Studies 
2 and 3 in the combined samples. Most religions encourage 
virtuous, upright behavior; thus, this association is unsurpris-
ing. Yet, religious devotion was not strongly related to the 
other components of honor. Some people have associated 
honor-related behavior (such as honor killings) with religion, 
but the existing anthropological research disputes that belief 
(Wikan, 2008). Our findings suggest that this perceived asso-
ciation between religion and honor may lie in the shared 
importance of moral behavior. It would be intriguing to fur-
ther explore the ways that religious beliefs and honor-related 
ideologies interact to influence behavior.
Moreover, this work did not uncover gendered dimen-
sions of honor, which has been the focus of other researchers 
(e.g., Barnes, Brown, & Osterman, 2012; Rodriguez 
Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2002b; Vandello et al., 
2009). The gender differences in these studies were inconsis-
tent (see footnotes) except for one finding: Men rated moral 
behavior as less central to the prototype of honor (Study 2) 
and less personally important (Study 3) than did women. 
There are many double standards in cultural norms and roles 
for men and women, and women may intuit that they have 
more to lose from moral missteps than do men. Because we 
did not directly ask for gendered features of honor, these 
findings may understate the importance of gendered social 
roles in honor-related behaviors.
Finally, our work sampled individuals from one honor 
culture, Turkey, and one nonhonor culture, Northern United 
States. We do not claim that these two groups represent all 
honor and nonhonor cultures, respectively, or that the 
observed dimensions of honor would apply to other cultural 
groups that have different histories and values. Further 
research is needed to investigate the replicability of the cur-
rent work.
Conclusion
These studies of lay prototypes of the construct of honor in 
Turkey and in the Northern United States reveal differences 
at the level of specific features but similarities in the primary 
underlying dimensions of Self-Respect, Moral Behavior, and 
Social Status/Respect. Researchers investigating the influ-
ence of honor on behavior will benefit from closer attention 
to the importance of moral behavior (and to how moral 
behavior is understood). The tripartite nature of honor uncov-
ered in these studies helps observers and scholars alike 
understand how opposing behaviors and responses to situa-
tions can be attributed to honor. In the Gezi Park uprisings, 
protestors seemed to view their behavior as driven by per-
sonal honor, whereas politicians argued that the protests 
harm the country’s respect in the eyes of others. Ultimately, 
research into the positive motivational force of honor on 
achievement, moral behavior, or altruism may help bring an 
end to some of the tragedies of honor, such as honor 
killings.
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Notes
1. In each study, we conducted a MANOVA on these background 
variables. The Turkish participants tended to be older than the 
Americans, .40 ≤ ds < .60 (except in Study 2, where there was 
no significant difference). Age was not a significant predictor in 
any of our analyses, so we do not report it further. The Turkish 
students also reported higher levels of religious devotion than 
did the Americans, .17 < ds < .5. Differences in socioeconomic 
status (SES) were more inconsistent: In Studies 1a and 2, there 
were no significant differences, whereas there were small dif-
ferences in Studies 1b and 3, with the Americans reporting 
somewhat higher levels of SES than the Turkish participants, 
.12 < ds < .26. Participants responded to the SES and religious 
devotion items using Likert-type scales, which are susceptible to 
reference group effects, so we urge caution in interpretation of 
any mean differences across cultures (Heine, Lehman, Peng, & 
Greenholtz, 2002).
2. Namus is typically defined as women’s sexual honor that pre-
supposes certain moral and physical qualities (see Sev’er & 
Yurdakul, 2001). It can also mean having integrity and being 
reliable and upright.
3. We examined gender differences in the generation of the spe-
cific features. In Turkey, there was a single feature (to fit into 
the rules of the society) that was generated significantly more 
frequently by women than by men (χ2 = 3.94, p < .05). Among 
Americans, there were three items that were generated more fre-
quently by women than by men (being respectful, self-respect, 
and being in the military), χ2 ≥ 4.97, ps < .03. Given that there 
were 145 analyses conducted, these four differences are likely 
due to chance alone.
4. A MANOVA conducted on the four factors revealed significant 
gender differences for Social Status and Respect, F(1, 602) = 
7.53, p < .01, and for Moral Behavior, F(1, 602) = 6.17, p < 
.02. In both the cases, men rated the items in the factor as less 
central to the prototype of honor than did women: for Social 
Status/Respect, M
men
 = −1.22, M
women
 = −.96, d = .22; for Moral 
Behavior, M
men
 = .83, M
women
 = .97, d = .16. When the centered 
factors were regressed individually onto cultural group, reli-
gious devotion, and SES (hierarchically), religious devotion did 
not mediate the effects of culture on Moral Behavior or Helping 
Others. Religious devotion was, however, a significant predictor 
of Social Status/Respect (β = .12, p < .01), Moral Behavior (β 
= .12, p < .01), and Helping Others (β = .11, p < .01), but not 
Self-Respect. SES did not significantly predict any of the factor 
scores.
5. The 11 items that were dropped were being admirable, not 
to have one’s own truths contradict society’s truths, to fit into 
customs and traditions, to be respected for what you do, being 
just, to have one’s own principles, to apply one’s own virtues, 
not compromising one’s own characteristics, having one’s own 
beliefs, how one holds himself or herself, being determined.
6. When the centered factors were regressed individually onto cul-
tural group, religious devotion, and SES, religious devotion was 
a significant predictor only of Moral Behavior (β = .32, p < .001). 
SES was a significant predictor of the personal importance of 
Social Status/Respect (β = .12, p < .01) and Moral Behavior (β = 
−.08, p < .08). A MANOVA of the three honor factors revealed sig-
nificant gender differences in the importance of Moral Behavior, 
F(1, 588) = 32.02, p < .001, η2p = .05, and in the importance of 
Self-Respect, F(1, 588) = 33.47, p < .001, η2p = .054. Women 
evaluated both the dimensions as more important than did men.
7. Additional analyses conducted within each culture revealed that 
these associations were not moderated by gender.
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